Do You Hear Me Now?

One of the little known ‘checks and balances’ in the American system of government is a court’s jurisdiction.  Jurisdiction is the power of a court to hear and decide a controversy.  Article III section I of the Constitution establishes the federal judiciary and place the power to create inferior or lower courts in the hands of Congress.  “The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” Article I section 8 clause 9 of the Constitution confirms Congress’ power to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme court.   Since Congress has the power to constitute courts, it has the power to limit a court’s jurisdiction.  In other word, since Congress has the power to create courts, it has the power to tell the court what cases it can and can’t hear and what statutes it can review and what statutes it can’t. 

Since the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Congress has attempted to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction or the power to review the decisions of the immigration bureaucracy made under the Immigration and Nationality Act [INA].  INA section 242 [8 USC §1252] is a prime example of Congress’ attempt to limit the judicial review of immigration decisions.  This statute purports to strip the court of the power to review removal orders. 

In an attempt to slam the courthouse door in the alien’s face, the Attorney General frequently argues that the court does not have the power to review the immigration service’s decision because Congress has stripped the court of jurisdiction.  Faced with a challenge to their power, federal judges sometimes go to great length to find that they have the power to review a decision, even when Congress says that they don’t.  The effect of Congress’ jurisdiction stripping legislation is that most immigration related judicial opinions have a sometimes-lengthy discussion on jurisdiction.  This includes the Tenth Circuit’s recent decision in Jimenez-Guzman v. Holder.

Jimenez-Guzman is a native and citizen of Mexico and lawful permanent resident in the United States.  In 2009, the Department of Homeland Security [DHS] commenced removal proceedings against Jimenez-Guzman.  DHS alleged that Jimenez-Guzman was removable from the United States due to conviction of a drug crime in Colorado.  Jimenez-Guzman asked for and received several continuances from the Immigration Judge [IJ] so that he could attempt to set aside his state court conviction. Relieved of the conviction, Jimenez-Guzman would no longer be removable.

On April 7, 2010, at a hearing in Immigration Court, Jimenez-Guzman informed the IJ that his attempts to set aside his drug conviction were unsuccessful.  He asked the court for another continuance so he may pursue an appeal of the state trial court’s decision to deny relief from his drug conviction.  Citing the length of time Jimenez-Guzman’s case had sat on the court's docket, the IJ refused to grant another continuance.  The IJ found Jimenez-Guzman removable and ordered him removed to Mexico. The Board of Immigration Appeals summarily dismissed Jimenez-Guzman’s appeal, and Jimenez-Guzman sought review of the IJ’s and BIA’s decision in the US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. 

The Attorney General argued that the Immigration and Nationality Act stripped the court of the power to review the IJ’s decision.  The court disagreed.  The IJ’s power to grant continuances comes from the court’s regulation and not the INA.  Citing Kucana v. Holder, __ U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 827 (2010), the court held it has the power to review IJ decisions that originate from regulations. “The Supreme Court … recently held that decisions made discretionary by regulation do not come within [the INA’s] statutory bar and are reviewable.”  Since the power to grant continuances of hearings is granted to the IJ by regulation and not by the INA, the INA’s jurisdiction stripping statutes do not apply.

The court then applied the rational basis test to the IJ’s decision to deny the continuance.  Under the rational basis standard, the court will overturn an IJ decision only if there is no rational explanation behind the IJ’s decision.  Since courts have held that an individual in removal proceedings does not have the right to stay removal proceedings while the respondent commences a collateral attack on the underlying criminal conviction, the IJ’s decision to deny the continuance based on the age of the removal case is rational.  The court denied the petition for review and allowed the IJ’s order to stand.

The tension between two co-equal branches of government finds it way into the world of immigration. Congress’ goals of make the immigration system as efficient and as streamlined as possible collide with the judiciary’s responsibility to review the decisions of the immigration system.  Nobody likes to be told “no”, especially life tenured, Senate confirmed federal judges. Congress attempts to strip the judiciary of the power to review immigration decisions gives the government and immigrants one more thing to argue about in court.

Copyright 2011, Richard M. Green All Rights Reserved

False Claim to US Citizenship: The Death Penalty of Immigration

Roger Williams

In January 1636, Roger Williams was banished from the Massachusetts Bay Colony. US immigration law has a similar fate for those who falsely claim to be a US citizen.  The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) renders inadmissible or forbids entry into the United States any alien who falsely claims to be a US citizen.  It states

Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under this chapter (including section 1324a of this title) or any other Federal or State law is inadmissible.  INA 212(a)(6)(ii).

Unlike other grounds of inadmissibility, there is no waiver available.  This means that the government cannot overlook and cannot forgive and admit an alien who falsely claims to be a US citizen even if the government wanted to.

On June 14, 2011, the US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in St. Paul, Minnesota handed down its decision in Sandoval v. Holder and wrestled to apply this statute to unaccompanied alien minors who falsely claim to be US citizens.

Alejandra Sandoval was born in Mexico in 1981.   As a small child, she illegally entered the United States with her family, settling in Minneapolis, Minnesota.  In January 1998, Sandoval returned to Mexico by air to visit relatives.  On January 10, 1998, Sandoval attempted to enter the United States at the Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport using the US birth certificate and Minnesota ID card of her US citizen sister.  Sandoval was 16 years old.  Sandoval’s deception was discovered by immigration at the airport, and she was returned to Mexico as an alien who has made a false claim to US citizenship. 

Sandoval then entered the US with the assistance of a smuggler and resumed her life.  Sandoval graduated from high school, got married, and gave birth to a child.  Her US citizen husband filed an immigrant petition, and Sandoval attempted to adjust status to lawful permanent resident (green card holder) when the incident at DFW came back to haunt her.  The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) denied Sandoval’s adjustment, and commenced removal proceedings alleging that she is an inadmissible alien who made a false claim to US citizenship.

Sandoval sought review of DHS’ inadmissibility determination before the Immigration Judge (IJ).  She argued that the false claim grounds of inadmissibility should not apply to her because she was an unaccompanied minor at the time of the false claim.  Analogizing a false claim to a capital crime, and citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) Sandoval argued that the false claim grounds of inadmissibility should not apply to her because capital punishment is not meted out to minors who commit capital crimes.  The government argued that the false claim statute does not discriminate based on age, and should be applied equally to all aliens regardless of age.

The IJ was sympathetic to Sandoval, and calld the false claim permanent bar to admissibility the ‘immigration version of the death penalty’.  The IJ ruled that an unaccompanied minor cannot be rendered inadmissible for making a false claim to US citizenship because minors ‘lack sufficient maturity to understand the scope and ramifications of [this] misconduct.”  The IJ overturned the DHS’ inadmissibility determination and granted Sandoval’s adjustment.

DHS appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals [BIA].  A single member of the BIA reversed the IJ’s decision and remanded the case back to the IJ. The BIA addresses Sandoval's legal argument with a single sentence of legal analysis.  “We find no legal authority or support for the Immigration Judge’s ‘bright line rule’ that persons under the age of 18 categorically lack maturity and mental capacity to falsely claim US citizenship”.

On remand from the BIA, the IJ denied Sandoval’s adjustment, holding that she is an alien who made a false claim to US citizenship.  Sandoval appealed to the BIA who summarily dismissed her appeal.  Sandoval then appealed the Eight Circuit Court of Appeal. 

The Eight Circuit blasts the BIA for failing to consider Sandoval’s argument and to articulate reasons why Sandoval’s argument was denied.  One sentence of legal analysis was not sufficient to satisfy the Court.  “Judicial deference is by no means a substitute for the Board’s duty to provide a reasoned, intelligible analysis for its decision.”  The Court remands or send Sandoval’s case back to the BIA with instructions to clarify the standards is uses in applying the false claim statute to unaccompanied minors and to articulate the reasons Sandoval deserves no relief under that standard.  This remand gives the BIA a third opportunity to adduce reasons the false claim statute should be applied to Sandoval. 


The Immigration Judge's analogy to capital punishment is apt.  Inadmissibility without waiver is the functional equivalent to banishment. Roger Williams illustrates that banishment is the second most severe punishment meted out by a court.  The most severe is death.  The rise of modern immigration laws has de-criminalized banishment and placed it squarely in the realm of civil immigration law.  The Sandoval court told the the BIA that is needs to use more than one sentence before banishing someone.

Expect a decision on the Sandoval remand upcoming months.  Given the level of criticism leveled by the Court, expect the BIA to issue a lengthily and well-reasoned decision.  Given the absence of law from the BIA in this area, the Sandoval decision could possibly be issued as a precedent decision.  Either way, expect more than one sentence out of the BIA.


Copyright 2011 Richard M. Green, All Rights Reserved

When Circuit Court Judges Disagree

Supreme Court Building

This week’s blog post is coming from San Diego, California and the 2011 American Immigration Lawyers Association Annual Conference.

On May 23, 2011 the U.S. Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari in a Ninth Circuit case entitled Kawashima v. Holder. Click here to read the docket from the U.S. Supreme Court.  This case offers a glimpse into the interpretation of immigration and tax law and the functioning of the highest court in the land.

In 1997, Akio Kawashima, a citizen of Japan and lawful permanent resident, plead guilty to subscribing a false statement on a tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. 7206(1).  This false statement caused a total tax loss to the government of $244,126.

 In 2001, the government commenced removal proceedings against Mr. Kawashima.  In the notice to appear before an Immigration Judge, the government charged Mr. Kawashima as an aggravated felon under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) because he is an alien that has been convicted of a crime that involves fraud or deceit where the loss to the victim is more than $10,000.

The government argued that subscribing a false statement on a tax return is a crime that involves fraud and deceit, and that the victim in this case is the US government. Citing a Third Circuit case entitled Ki Se Lee v. Ashcroft, Mr. Kawashima argued that the INA’s “fraud and deceit” aggravated felony definition did not apply to tax cases because the INA’s aggravated felony definition has a separate tax crime section.  Under the INA, an alien is an aggravated felon if they are convicted of tax evasion under 26 USC 7201.  Since Mr. Kawashima was not convicted of tax evasion, he is not an aggravated felon. 

The Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals agreed with the government, and the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco, California dismissed Mr. Kawashima’s petition for review, agreeing that there is no reason to exclude tax crimes from the “fraud and deceit” definition of an aggravated felony.

This decision has created a split in the circuits.  Lower courts are bound to follow the decisions of higher courts.  Under the present state of the law, geography plays a factor in the outcome of a deportation case involving subscribing a false statement on a tax return.  An individual who is placed into removal proceedings in the Third Circuit (Delaware, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Virgin Islands) is not an aggravated felon.  An individual in removal proceedings in the nine western states that compose the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal is an aggravated felon.  The US Supreme Court has stepped in to resolve the split in the circuits and give a ruling on the issue that binds all courts across the entire country.

How will the Supreme Court rule on this case?  It’s difficult to say.  On the one hand, some say that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal is the most reversed court of appeal in the United States.  On the other hand, one Third Circuit justice on the Ki See Lee panel dissented from the majority opinion.  This justice thought subscribing a false tax return was a “fraud and deceit” aggravated felony that should result in deportation.  The dissenter was Samuel Alito.  Expect oral argument in the fall and a decision next spring.

Copyright 2011 Richard M. Green, All Rights Reserved

The Appeal's in the Mail!

If an appeal of an order of removal arrives at the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) a day late due to an error made by the post office, should the alien be deported?  That is the question in Irigoyen-Briones v. Holder, a recent decision from U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in San Francisco.

On December 18, 2006, Mr. Irigoyen-Briones was ordered deported by an Immigration Judge (IJ).  At the conclusion of the deportation hearing, Mr. Irigoyen-Briones was instructed that if he wished to appeal the IJ’s decision, his notice of appeal must be filed with the Board of Immigration Appeals in Virginia in 30 days.  This means that Mr. Irigoyen-Briones’ paper notice of appeal must physically arrive at the BIA’s office in Falls Church, Virginia by January 17, 2007.  If the notice of appeal does not arrive by the proscribed date, Mr. Irigoyen-Briones’ order of deportation becomes final.

Following this hearing, Mr. Irigoyen-Briones consulted with and retained an attorney.  The attorney went to the Immigration Court to review the record of the deportation case and conducted legal research.  On January 16, 2007, the attorney mailed the notice of appeal to the BIA using the postal service’s express mail overnight delivery service.  The BIA rejected the Irigoyen-Briones’s appeal because the postal service delivered the notice of appeal on January 18, 2007, one day late.  Irigoyen-Briones appealed the BIA’s decision to reject his appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal.

BIA appeals arriving one day late due to an error made by an overnight delivery service has been the subject of a fair amount of litigation.  In 2005, the Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit Courts of Appeal reversed the BIA’s decision to reject these appeals, ruling that the principles of equity or fundamental fairness apply to appeals that arrive at the BIA one day late due to an error outside the control of the alien.  Click here and here to read those decisions.  In 2006, the BIA held that it does not have the jurisdiction or the authority to accept a late filed appeal.  The BIA held that the statute governing the time and process for filing an appeal does not permit the BIA to accept a late appeal no matter whose fault it is that the appeal arrived late.  Click here to read that decision in a pdf format.

The BIA advanced this argument in Irigoyen-Briones, and the court was unimpressed.  The court held that the statute governing BIA appeals is not jurisdictional because Congress did not limit the authority of the BIA to accept appeals, and the BIA’s regulation does not state that it considers the regulation jurisdictional.  The court observed that the statute governing the manner of appeals simply states that the BIA may set regulations governing the acceptance of appeals. 

The BIA also argued that it has an interest in the fair administration of justice by strictly enforcing its 30 day deadline.  The court dismissed this argument too, holding that solo practitioners and not large law firms typically litigate immigration appeals.  Thirty days is not a long time to prepare an appeal, and that the alien should not bear so high a price (deportation) for an error outside their control.  The court also observes that the BIA controls the manner the acceptance of appeals, and that the BIA is free to adopt filing methods that do not rely on papersuch as electronic filing.   The alien should be assured that when he or she exercises reasonable diligence by depositing a notice of appeal with an overnight delivery service on day 29, that the BIA will accept the appeal even if it arrives on day 31.

Finally, the BIA argued that it does not have a “mailbox rule” or postmarked deadline.  A mailbox rule allows an individual to comply with a deadline by ensuring that the post office postmarks their application by the proscribed date.  The court dismisses this argument saying that Irigoyen-Briones does not argue that the BIA has a mailbox rule.  Irigoyen-Briones argues that it is fundamentally unfair to be punished with deportation for an error outside of his control.

The court reversed its decision to reject the Irigoyen-Briones appeal and remanded it to the BIA to either accept the appeal or find another reason to reject it. The lesson to be learned from this case is that the immigration agencies do not think that the principles of equity apply to them.  They do not consider what is fair and what is right in its decision-making process.  They are happy to strictly adhere to their self authored rules, and are willing to transfer the risk of late delivery on the back of the applicant.

Copyright 2011 Richard M. Green, All Rights Reserved

Denationalization and Economic Hardship as a Form of Persecution

This week the blog takes a look at the law of asylum.  The Immigration and Nationality Act grants refugee status or the permanent right of abode and access to the labor market to foreign nationals that have a well founded fear of persecution on the basis of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a social group. 

On May 20, 2011 the US Court of Appeal for the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati, Ohio released its opinion in Stserba v. Holder.  In its decision, the court reversed and remanded the Stserba family’s asylum applications to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA).  On remand, the Court asked the BIA to address the whether denationalization and loss of professional credentials on account of ethnicity constitutes persecution that may serve as the basis for a grant of asylum.

In 1940, the Soviet Army occupied Estonia to defend it from the advancing German Army.  At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union annexed Estonia.  In 1991, Estonia regained its independence from the Soviet Union.   Free of their Soviet overlords, the Estonian government passed a series of measures aimed at the ethnic Russian living in Estonia.  These measures included a statute that denationalized all ethnic Russians that has no ancestors residing in Estonia in 1940.  Additionally, in 1998, Estonia withdrew from the Estonian-Russian agreement regarding educational degrees.  Russian diplomas are not valid in Estonia.

In 2003, Lilia Stserba, a citizen of Estonia and ethnic Russian, and Igor Pabo, a Russian citizen entered the United States as visitors.  They settled in Cincinnati, Ohio and filed for asylum.  In their asylum application Lilia Stserba complained that as an ethnic Russian living in Estonia, she was persecuted by Estonia’s denationalization statute and was effectively stateless.  Additionally, Lilia Stserba was trained as a pediatrician in Leningrad.  She complained that Estonia’s unilateral withdrawal from the agreement recognizing Russian educational degrees deprived her of the ability to practice her chosen profession.  Additionally Both Dr. Stserba and Mr. Pabo complained of substandard and the withholding of medical care from the government run medical system and of receiving racial epitaphs and minor physical assaults at the hands the local populace in Estonia as a result of their Russian ethnicity.

The USCIS’ Asylum Office and Immigration Court denied the Stserba family’s asylum application.  At their deportation hearing, the Immigration Judge (IJ) found that the invalidation of Dr. Stserba’s medical credentials was not persecution because Dr. Stserba found work after the invalidation of her credentials.  Dr. Stserba found employment as a baby sitter and as a pediatrician at a Russian school willing to overlook the fact that her credentials were invalid.  Additionally, the IJ held that the invalidation of Dr. Stserba’s medical credentials was not based on her ethnicity.  All Russian educational credentials were invalidated in Estonia.  Additionally, the IJ held that Dr. Stserba had suffered no harm from the loss of her Estonian citizenship because she was able to regain it several years later.  Finally, the IJ disposed of Mr. Pabo’s claim stating that the harm he suffered at the hands of the Estonian populace was not sufficiently severe to warrant a grant of asylum.  The IJ ordered Dr. Stserba deported to Estonia and Mr. Palo deported to Russia.  The Stserba family appealed to the BIA and then to the Circuit Court of Appeal.

The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded the Stserba family’s asylum claim to the BIA holding that neither the IJ nor the BIA had adequately discussed the issue of forced denationalization as persecution.  The court held that people have a fundamental right to citizenship, and that forced denationalization that results in statelessness can constitute persecution.  Although the mere creation of statelessness or the change of citizenship as a result of a governmental or border change does not give rise to a claim of asylum in the United States, a person who is made stateless on account of membership in a protected group has demonstrated persecution. 

The Court was equally unimpressed with the IJ’s and BIA’s handling of Dr. Stserba’s claim of loss of livelihood.  The court held that a government’s limitation of opportunities for an individual to continue to work in their chosen profession may constitute persecution even though an individual may continue to work in a field other than that of their choosing.  Even though the IJ correctly noted that the invalidation of Russian diplomas is not limited to ethnic Russians, the IJ ignored the desperate impact of this policy.  The only residents of Estonia that poses the Russian language skill and desire to attend a Russian university would be ethnic Russians.

Finally the Court notes that Mr. Pabo’s mistreatment in Estonia by itself probably does not rise to the level of harm necessary to constitute persecution.  However the Court reverses and remands Mr. Pabo’s asylum application to the BIA with instructions to consider Mr. Pabo’s claim in the aggregate with Dr. Stserba’s claims.  A collection of harmful events that when considered individually do not rise to the level of persecution may be considered persecution when considered together.


Copyright 2011 Richard M. Green, All Rights Reserved

The Two Edged Sword: Citizenship Discrimination in Employment Revisited

Last week, the blog discussed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 and the twin immigration related employment enforcement mechanisms:  Employment of an unauthorized alien and unlawful discrimination on the basis of alienage.

This week, the blog delves deeper into one of these issues: Unlawful discrimination on the basis of alienage.  The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 criminalized the employment of an unauthorized alien.  The anti-discrimination statute was added to IRCA as a protection to aliens who had the right to live and work in the United States.  Some members of Congress feared that with the criminalization of employment of an unauthorized alien, many businesses would comply with the new law by simply refusing to hire non-US citizens.

The bulk of the work of the Justice Department’s Office of Special Counsel for Immigration-Related Unfair Employment Practices seems to be directed at punishing employers who prefer US citizen workers and unfairly discriminate against non-citizens who are permitted to live and work in the United States.  In the last two months, the Justice Department recently settled charges they brought against a community college district in Arizona, a fast food franchise operator in Maine and an agricultural staffing agency in Iowa for unfairly discriminating against non-citizens.

But the law is a two-edged sword.  IRCA’s anti-discrimination provisions also prevent employers from discriminating against US citizens in favor of hiring individuals who are not authorized to work but can be made authorized by filing a visa petition.  IRCA protects US citizens, aliens admitted for permanent residence (also known as green card holders), individuals who have been granted asylum and individuals granted refugee status from unfair employment related discrimination. 

On May 17, 2011, the Office of Special Counsel announced the settlement of a citizenship discrimination claim brought against Iflowsoft, LLC, a New Jersey information technology staffing agency.  The OSC alleged that Iflowsoft discriminated against US citizens in its hiring practices by expressing a preference for non-citizen temporary visa holders in its employment advertising.  Click here to read OSC's press release,and click here to read the the settlement agreement. 

Specifically, the OSC found that Iflowsoft violated the anti-discrimination provisions of IRCA becasse it advertised that it preferred individuals who needed an H-1 visa transfer or change of status from F-1 student to H-1.  The OSC found that Iflowsoft did not consider qualified US citizens who applied for jobs with the company.  Temporary non-immigrants such as H-1B visa holders are not protected by the anti discrimination provisions of IRCA.

As a result of the settlement, Iflowsoft will pay a civil penalty of $6,400 to the Justice Department, $7,158.49 in back pay to the two US citizens that complained, and adopt personnel policies to avoid such discriminatory practices in the future. 


Copyright 2011 Richard M. Green, All Rights Reserved

Immigration Employment Verification: Charting a Course between the Devil and The Deep Blue Sea

As President Obama hits the campaign trail for immigration reform this week, let’s take a look back at the last time Congress created a pathway for illegal immigrants to regularize their status:  The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA).  Passed by both houses of Congress and signed into law by President Regan in 1986, IRCA amended the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) to permit individuals who had been illegally present in the United States since January 1, 1982 to regularize their status.

In the horse trading that is the legislative process, the following deal was struck:  In exchange for the amnesty for illegal immigrants described above, IRCA added a provision to the INA that required employers to verify the immigration status of their employees.  IRCA criminalizes the employment of illegal aliens, and somewhat paradoxically, prohibits employers from discriminating in hiring decisions on the basis of citizenship or immigration status.  Thanks to IRCA, employers must sail between Scylla and Charybdis.  They walk a tightrope between the twin evils of hiring unauthorized aliens and discriminating on the basis of alienage with every hiring decision.

Although all the individuals who benefited from IRCA’s amnesty have long since received permanent residence and naturalized, the employer mandates of IRCA live on today.  IRCA’s mandates on employers are enforced by two separate agencies:  The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement.  As the two news articles listed below indicate, both agencies have been busy.

1.       On March 8, 2011 Rick M. Vartanian, the president and primary shareholder of Brownwood Furniture, was sentenced to ten months in federal prison for obstruction of justice and the employment of illegal aliens.  Mr. Vartanian was also ordered to pay a $15,000 fine.  Read about Mr. Vartainian’s troubles here and here.

2.       On April 26, 2011 the Civil Rights Division of the US Justice Department announced a settlement agreement with Restwend, LLC, the operator of several Wendy’s restaurants in Maine.  The Justice Department accused Restwend of engaging in illegal employment discrimination against non-US citizens by only hiring US citizens to work in its restaurants.  Restwend agreed to pay a fine, back pay to the potential worker that was discriminated against, and to train its human resources staff.  Read about Restwend’s settlement here and here.

Immigration enforcement is on the rise.  Employers should consider consulting with competent immigration counsel before charting a course between the devil and the deep blue sea.


Copyright 2011 Richard M. Green, All Rights Reserved